FOUNDED: February 9, 2001
|11-03-2008, 08:05 PM||#1|
Join Date: Nov 2008
New Second Amendment Case as a Human Rights Case
HISTORY IN THE MAKING!
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHTS CASE
I am the first person to use Heller as evidence in a human rights case at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in defense of the Second Amendment as a human right at the international level.
WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR ME:
TASK (1): Review my 600-page lawsuit at [usopencarry.thevaughts.net/hamrick[DOT]pdf]CASE (1): Don Hamrick v. President Bush, U.S. District Court for DC, No. 08-1698-EGS, filed October 6, 2008. Second Amendment case for the right to openly keep and bear arms in intrastate, interstate, and maritime travel, in the form of a "National Open Carry Handgun" on my Merchant Mariner's Document (ID card) from a U.S. merchant seaman's point of view. See pages 1 - 4 (after the Table of Contents) for the link to my human rights petition at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
CASE (2): Don Hamrick v. United States [download257.mediafire[DOT]com/mydpdvgysmdg/jkr3mqi4jho/PETITION_IACHR[DOT]pdf], Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Petition No. 1142-06 (international human rights complaint is still active pending admissibility determination. For more information contact Kevin Alan Baumert, Assist Legal Advisor for Human Rights and Refugee Affairs (L/HRR) 3422 HST; Office of the Legal Advisor (L); U.S. Department of State; 2201 C Street NW; Washington, DC 20520; Telephone No. (202) 647-2773.
My human rights petition impacts Jessica Lenahan (formerly Gonzales) human rights complaint Jessica Gonzales v. United States, Petition No. 1490-05 [3w[DOT]iachr[DOT]org/annualrep/2007eng/USA1490.05eng[DOT]htm] in the matter of Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, individually and a next best friend of her deceased minor children, Gonzales et al. 545 U.S. 748 (June 27, 2005). [caselaw.lp.findlaw[DOT]com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=04-278] See also Cornell University Law School. [3w[DOT]law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-278.ZS[DOT]html]
My blog: American Common Defence Review
Excerpt from my letter to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights re: HELLER:
TITLE OF LETTER:MY COMMENTARY TO THE ABOVE:
NOTE: April 19, 2002 [Patriots Day] Letter from the U.S. Coast Guard stating: [download257.mediafire[DOT]com/atwnpzyn4ndg/jnu9egz43d4/CG_LETTER_APR_19_02[DOT]pdf]
"As you have noted, the laws and regulations do not provide for such an endorsement nor do they prohibit it. Instead, the matter is left to my judgment. My decision, after considering all the material you have submitted, is that it would not be in the best interest of marine safety or security to initiate the endorsement you have applied for."CAUSE OF ACTION:
When there are no federal laws or regulations concerning the Second Amendment rights of U.S. merchant seamen in intrastate, interstate or maritime travel as admitted by the U.S. Coast Guard is the Coast Guard obligated by the Oath of Office to support and defend the Constitution of the United States also obligated to support and defend the Second Amendment rights of U.S. merchant seaman? Did the U.S. Coast Guard have the discretion to use personal judgment (i.e., political bias?) to deny my Second Amendment application when there were no federal laws or regulations to base the denial upon or was the Coast Guard required to grant my application as a ministerial duty under the Oath of Office's obligation to support and defend the Second Amendment when there were no federal laws or regulations to rely upon?
NOTE: October 2, 2002 Letter from NRA Attorney Robert Dowlut stating: [download257.mediafire[DOT]com/djyynytcqgig/jryuhznyjbo/NRA_ROBERT_DOWLUT_2002_REFUSAL_LETTER[DOT]pdf]
"We decline your invitation to become involved in your pro se litigation."That was then, this is now!
DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION:
In my original lawsuit, Hamrick v. President Bush, U.S. District Court for DC, No. 02-1435, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle dismissed my case with prejudice:
On July 18, 2002, petitioner filed a pro se Petition for A Writ of Mandamus, requesting this Court, inter alia, to compel the President of the United States to protect the constitutional rights of sailors in the U.S. Merchant Marine to carry handguns while ashore in the United States, to strike various federal statutes and regulations restricting individuals' right to transport firearms across state lines on the grounds that they violate the Second, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and to compel the U.S. Coast Guard to approve petitioner's application for "National Open Carry Handgun" endorsement on his Merchant Marine document. Petitioner has not served a complaint and summons on any of the parties he has named as respondents, seeking instead to use a petition-show cause order approach for the resolution of his grievances. Regardless of whether such an approach is appropriate in light of Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is clear that petitioner cannot satisfy the stringent standards for mandamus relief and therefore that his petition must be dismissed.MY ADVANTAGE NOW:
IN REBUTTAL TO JUDGE ELLEN SEGAL HUVELLE'S ". . . no court has ever so much as suggested that the Thirteenth Amendment confers any right to bear arms, and it is entirely fanciful to suggest that its prohibition of involuntary servitude somehow unambiguously requires the overturning of a whole variety of gun control legislation."
Mark Tushnet, Two Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-17 (forthcoming in the Ohio State Law Journal)
The first of these companion essays, "Heller and the New Originalism," forthcoming in the Ohio State Law Journal, argues that the new originalism, as exemplified in Heller, does not avoid the general kinds of difficulties associated with the old originalism, at least to the extent that the new originalism is defended as providing, in Justice Scalia's terms, a solid, rock-hard Constitution. It describes several difficulties with the new originalism as displayed in Heller, including the assumption that meanings are stable over long periods of time, the possibility that meanings of constitutional terms are contested at the time the terms are inserted into the Constitution, and the difficulty that meanings are necessarily indexed to the conditions under which words are used.
The second essay, "Heller and the Perils of Compromise," forthcoming in the Lewis & Clark Law Review, describes the ways in which the absolutist rhetoric about the appropriate method of constitutional interpretation that predominates in Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Heller is in tension with the asserted presumptive constitutionality of numerous gun regulations, and argues that "interest-balancing" of the sort Justice Scalia criticizes is inevitable in constitutional interpretation, even within Justice Scalia's assertedly non-balancing approach. It speculates that the compromises embedded in Heller make it likely that the decision will unravel, leading either to quite robust restrictions on gun regulation or, more likely, a quite weak Second Amendment. I suggest that the Heller decision may be for the Second Amendment what early decisions were for the so-called Federalism and Takings Revolutions: decisions that promised real change in prevailing constitutional doctrine, but that failed to deliver on the promise
Note the last sentence in Mark Tushnet's, Heller and the Perils of Compromise:
"Culture wars produce repeated battles in the courts and symbolic victories and defeats there, but permanent victory comes from developments elsewhere, which then yield real rather than symbolic decisions by the courts."Elsewhere?
A Regulatory War
What about a "Regulatory War" from a U.S. Merchant Seaman's point of view?
What about applying the Second Amendment to regulations for the supression of piracy such as 33 U.S.C. § 383. Resistance of Pirates by Merchant Vessels and 33 C.F.R. § 104.220 Company or Vessel Personnel with Security Duties and 33 C.F.R. § 104.230 Drill and exercise requirements.?
There is an argument that the U.S. Government regulations requiring seamen to perform security duties under Homeland Security directives yet denying seamen their Second Amendment rights to personal security and armed self-defense presents questions of government liability for personal injuries or deaths resulting from the performance of security duties. There is also an argument that such mandatory duties without proper recognition of Second Amendment or Ninth Amendment rights may stand as violations of the "involuntary servitude" clause of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417, 450-451 (1857):
"The legislation of the States therefore shows, in a manner not to be mistaken, the inferior and subject condition of that race at the time the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards, throughout the thirteen States by which that instrument was framed; and it is hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized; whom, as we are bound, out of respect to the State sovereignties, to assume they had deemed it just and necessary thus to stigmatize, and upon whom they had impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation; or, that when they met in convention to form the Constitution, they looked upon them as a portion of their constituents, or designed to include them in the provisions so carefully inserted for the security and protection of the liberties and rights of their citizens. It cannot be supposed that they intended to secure to them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the police [60 U.S. 393, 417] regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the State."The Dred Scott case is the origin of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. That in itself would imply a Second Amendment right to "openly" keep and bear arms in intrastate, interstate, and maritime travel for the U.S. merchant seaman (civilian sailor)!
Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863 states, in part:
"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.DECLARATION: National Open Carry Handgun under the Second Amendment and the Ninth Amendment is "Actual Freedom!"
The U.S. Coast Guard is a "naval authority."
On April 19, 2002, Partiots Day, the U.S. Coast Guard denied my application for a "non-existent" endorsement on my Merchant Mariner's Document to read "National Open Carry Handgun" resulting from federally required "small arms" training as an "Able Seaman" as a prerequisite for employment aboard U.S. Government vessels under 46 U.S.C. § 7306(a)(3).
Under the Collective Right of the State interpretation Judge Huvelle said of my case: "petitioner's claims appear largely without merit."
Under the Heller interpretation [3w.supremecourtus[DOT]gov/opinions/07pdf/07-290[DOT]pdf] my case does, in fact and law, has merit to proceed to a civil jury trial under the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial under the Common Law.
HELLER AND HUMAN RIGHTS
SCALIA'S OPINION IN HELLER:
PAGE 9-10. FOOTNOTE 7: ". . . W.Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833) (with reference to colonists' English rights: "The right of every individual to keep arms for his defence, suitable to his condition and degree; which was the public allowance, under due restrictions of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation")Scalia's use of the terms "natural right" and "inherent right" by definition is the same as "human right." Because of these facts I cited the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1969 and the VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1986 to claim that Heller is a "fundamental change of circumstances" (Article 62 of both Vienna Conventions) for the "emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law" ("jus cogens"), (Article 64 of both Vienna Conventions) for the "right to life" provisions in international human rights treaties through the treaty clause in Article II, Section 2 of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a human right under the AMERICAN DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN in my letter to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in support of my human rights complaint against the United States.
This is the basis for both my Second Amendment case at the U.S. District Court for DC and my human rights complaint against the United States at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Now! I need your grassroots support by promoting the merits of my case to the NRA, the SAF, Gun Owners of America, JPFO, Second Amendment Sisters, and every other Second Amendment advocacy group.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME
SIGNED: DON HAMRICK