Is the Main Battle Tank obsolete?

[Pistolenschutze]

Polish, not only are you stooping to sheer sophistry, now you are bordering on revisionism!

Originally Posted by polishshooter

No the ONLY "statistic" or scorecard that really matters is how many operational tanks were still capable of combat IN GERMANY in April 1945...

Allies- THOUSANDS

Germany- ZERO.

In logic, the kind of argument you present is called a "Fallacy of Accident," Polish. Your conclusion has nothing to do with the original argument. It breaks down like this:

P1. The United States and its Allies won the Second World War against Germany.
P2. The United States and its Allies used the M4 Sherman tank against Germany.
P3. Germany lost the Second World War to the United States and its Allies.
P4. Germany used Tiger and Panther tanks against the United States and its Allies.

THEREFORE: The M4 Sherman tank was a better tank than the Tigers and Panthers.

Such arguments prove nothing. It is patently obvious that the Allies won World War II against Germany using the M4 tank. That proves absolutely nothing about the quality or capability of the M4 vs. the German tanks, only that Germany lost the war, a fact already conceded. The true operative question is, "why did Germany lose the war?" It lost for many reasons, not the least of which was a population base too small to stave off the massive forces arrayed against it, and the relative lack of production capability to construct the tools of war in sufficient quantities. Contrary to what you are trying to argue, the loss of the war has nothing logically to do with the relative merits of Allied v. German tanks. I suspect the Allies would have won had they used only British Matildas or American M3 Stuarts, assuming they built enough of them. No, Polish, the statistics I quoted are indeed relevant if the argument focuses on tank capability qua tank capability.

[polishshooter]

Pistol, you STILL aren't getting it, let me try again...

EVERY tank design is a trade off of the BIG three, Fire power, protection, and mobility.

As simple as that sounds, though, it is a LOT more complicated than that...and Fire power and protection are the EASIEST to design into a tank. Theoretically, you could put a 16" naval gun into a Turret with 14 FEET of armored plate, if you wanted to...in a strategic location, it just might ALSO knock out a LOT of opposing tanks, AND be tough to knock out, but you would then call it a "Fort," not a "tank," since it would have NO mobility....


MOBILITY is the trickiest part of the design pie, and it IS limited both by available engines, transmissions, suspensions, as WELL as production capabilities, and the industrial capability of the country, (like, can it MAKE enough of them to be effective?) actually producing it. OTHER things go into it as well, such as where it will FIGHT, the climate, as WELL as how far it is expected to be SHIPPED to fight in what potential theater...

BUT, it can be argued, and most experts will AGREE, that MOBILITY is the ESSENCE of armored warfare. HECK, tanks were INVENTED to bring mobility BACK to a stagnant battlefield dominated by modern artillery and automatic weapons...

And the GERMANS were the best students of the "New" type of war of mobility, brought about by intelligent use of tanks as the spearhead, rather than just another "support" weapon. And in PRACTICE they showed the entire world that DOCTRINE,and offensive use of tanks, no MATTER their firepower or protection, was the key! If you COULD give it decent firepower or protection, while NOT sacrificing "acceptable" mobility (OBVIOUSLY some degradation of mobility is needed, with ANY armor or decent gun, but how MUCH?) that was GRAVY, but NOT absolutely essential! Like the Germans THEMSELVES proved in Poland, France and the Low Countries, in Africa, and in Russia until mid 1943, with ADEQUATE tanks, mobile, but under gunned and less well armored, than MANY tanks they faced!

While it only planned for the OFFENSIVE in it's tank doctrine, Germany ALSO developed a DEFENSIVE doctrine, of mobile reserves behind a lightly defended line, racing to threatened breakthroughs and COUNTERATTACKING (which is actually an OFFENSIVE operation,) to stop, or even defeat the enemy's attack. Germany had several BRILLIANT armor officers, such as Manstein, who developed it to such a fine degree that his divisions were called the "Fire Brigades," covering large amounts of territory, to launch a LOCALIZED counterattack at the PERFECT spot to thwart a much LARGER force of attacking Russians...but the KEY, was MOBILITY.

BUT, while the Panther COULD have been the best tank of the war, it suffered because even it was too heavy for the industrial capacity of the nation, and too heavy for the available automotive components, which never progressed much beyond the strength needed for the EARLY Pzkw IV, that weighed about 25 tons! But it was still a manageable tank, at 45 tons, maybe with a little lightening, either with less armor, or a slightly smaller profile, especially width, it MIGHT have been the best tank of the war, and probably would have been the tank most copied in the immediate Post -war era.

BUT, close is only good in hand grenades and horseshoes...

The TIGER II, was an absurdity...literally the immobile fort, using the automotive components already proved to be too light for the PANTHER....

Tank design has ALWAYS followed the oscillations and cycles of Light, to heavy, to TOO heavy for mobility, back to light....and the cycle continued...

The late war German tanks, at 60-70 tons, are generally regarded by experts(OTHER than me...) as TOO HEAVY on that scale, which resulted in the immediate post war REDUCTION to about 40-45 tons for new MBTs...BECAUSE Mobility suffered so much, NOBODY could build tanks that large to be dependable (i.e., the relatively QUICK retirement of the JS IIs and IIIs by the Soviet Union, who rarely retired ANYTHING, and the ill fated Conqueror and the US M103...they suffered the SAME fate as the Tiger II, too heavy, too LACKING in mobility to be practical for modern military operations, and taking up too many resources just to GET them there....)

Tanks are AGAIN going up in weight, the Abrams, LeClercs, Challengers, Leopards, T-80s, Merkavas...are all in the same size range of the Tiger II, BUT that is with powerplants that have exponentially improved since then..Doubled or TRIPLED the bhp of the Tiger's puny Maybach! What has ALSO improved exponentially is the metallurgy needed to build TRANSMISSIONS, and SUSPENSIONS that can HANDLE that extra power! Throw in the fact that the new laminated Chobham type ARMOR is so much LIGHTER than hardened steel, a LOT of that weight is in new electrical servos (not Hydraulics!) to traverse the turret quickly, and elevate and, coupled with LARGER work areas than the narrow turrets of the Panther or Tiger, to allow the crew to USE the large guns as fast as the US tankers loaded their 75's or the Russians loaded their 76s, OR the Germans used to load their 50mms or shorter 75s!

BUT we at at the extreme of almost "too large" AGAIN...the NEXT "tanks" , according to MANY experts, do to the changing nature of war as WELL as new technology, will probably be MUCH smaller AGAIN!

SO what I am saying, is the German designers made a CONSCIOUS decision, to make mere THOUSANDS of the Panther, and mere HUNDREDS of the Tiger IIS, while at the same time knowing that such production would take up so much production capacity that the production of other PROVEN designs would ALSO be reduced......

They made a CONSCIOUS decision (helped by some of the General Staff, who misread the success of the T-34s and KV-Is handled by now COMPETENT Russian Armor commanders, and claimed that "Blitzkrieg" was dead, and the only thing that mattered, to beat the Russians, were superior guns and armor.(All the while MANSTEIN is DEFEATING them with Panzer IVs by USING mobility...and is demanding MORE IVs, not BETTER tanks!) to make tanks HEAVIER, and LESS fuel efficient, KNOWING they didn't have the fuel or shipping capacity to GET them to the Front...much less the fuel to TRAIN crews properly to USE them...at a time when German Tank crews were being lost at a very high rate in Russia, and the replacements were already suffering from the effects of inadequate training....in older much DIFFERENT tanks than the ones they would actually take into battle....

Made the conscious decision (UNDERSTANDABLE, if you have convinced yourself "mobility" is overrated....) that they did not NEED to be able to road march, they can be shipped by RAIL...(of course, KNOWING that they probably wouldn't be able to USE the rails much longer, due to Allied tactical airpower...)



At the same time, on the OTHER side of the pond, America made DIFFERENT decisions...first, in the pre-war austerity budgets, the Army did NOT buy many tanks...but spent what little R&D they had on ENGINES, and automotive parts like TRANSMISSIONS...and kept their main tanks (the M2 light and the M2 Medium) simple, and easy to maintain, and dead meat if they ever went into battle...

BUT we ALSO trained in them hard, and had pretty decently trained armor officers TOO, who were the cadre between the wars...

In OUR exercises, tanks were used to EXPLOIT, to MANEUVER, enemy tanks were dealt with ny the INFANTRY, with artillery and AT guns, later by SP AT guns, the Tank Destroyers...tanks were DESIGNED to fight infantry, why our pre war tanks were BRISTLING with MGs, even FIXED ones controlled by the driver, like a FIGHTER plane!

When the war started, our tanks were WOEFULLY inadequate, but with the massive influx of money, tank designs started flowing in...BUT one problem is that no American Factory had the capability or know how to cast a turret ring large enough for a gun larger than 37mm, or for more than two men!

But using the excellent, well understood, totally "debugged: engines, transmissions, powertrains, plus suspensions, that we ALREADY had developed, we built tanks around THEM. And QUICKLY made THOUSANDS of M3 Lee and Grants that we NOW trained with, plus gave to our Allies, which pulled the British chestnuts out of the fire in Africa..Quickly dominating the German Panzer IIIs, and giving the Brits something to engage with HE the 88s of Rommel while advancing, but MORE importantly, gave the Brits what was about their FIRST tanks..the OTHER was the M3 Stuart...that were mechanically RELIABLE, fast, easy to maintain, AND didn't throw tracks easily!

But we KNEW that it was a "stopgap..." and kept working on a replacement...but one of the design parameters was it HAD to use the same engine, suspension and powertrain we knew so well, and already had in production...PLUS it could NOT be over 35 tons, and LARGER than the size it was, even down to the width of railroad cars and the TUNNELS each tank would have to pass on the way to the PORTS, and sized to take up the least amount of cube available in the hulls of ships...ALL of those parameters, were taken into account, and YES, were MOBILITY strenghts at the Expense of FIREPOWER and PROTECTION...

But one other SMALL thing...it was exactly the tank ALSO requested by the Army, and it's armored commanders!

THAT decision, or "limitation," is EXACTLY why we COULD build 46,732 M4 tanks of all types, along with another 15000 armored vehicles using the M4 hull, from 1942 through 1945...

The decisions the GERMAN'S made in THEIR tank designs, limited THEIR TOTAL tank production of ALL types, during the SAME period, to only 18,870...that had to fight on TWO fronts...

So DON'T just gloss over, and give the "pat" answer that "Superior" German tanks were simply beaten by "sheer numbers...." That is the FIRST thing I hope you quit teaching, not only because it belittles the very sacrifices of the American tanker, but by the GREAT team of designers,industrialists, and factory workers that GAVE us this war winning design! It is simply and patently UNTRUE that "America made a conscious decision to send US tankers to their deaths in inferior tanks..." There were conscious, well though out, logical and CORRECT decisions to build the BEST tank we could, in the numbers we needed, as WELL as ongoing and frantic experiments to constantly IMPROVE that tank as we built them....while NOT sacrificing any mobility or dependability...in the tank in which our tankers ultimately performed so WELL.

The TANK BATTLES of WWII were decided on the DESIGN TABLES....and the decisions made by the Americans regarding the M4 were the BETTER decisions...and that and that ALONE should convince you which in fact were thus the "Better" design!

And the Shermans AGAIN were superior tanks in Africa, except for the "few" Tiger Is, (few because they took up too much valuable shipping space which was in short supply,) were proved to be too HEAVY, too fuel inefficient, and too unreliable to be anything but a curiosity, in the small numbers they were faced....AND the Sherman's M3 gun was found to be ADEQUATE when it faced them...NOT great, but ADEQUATE...

That is ALSO why Belton Cooper is wrong, claiming the M26 was somehow consciously delayed, and could have been fielded earlier ...and why I so strongly DISAGREE with your statement that America SHOULD have designed a "bigger and better" tank earlier!

We had NO confidence we could build in wartime a TOTALLY different tank, with wholly NEW engines, transmissions, and suspensions, AND get all the bugs worked out, and the crews trained, before the war would end! AND if the bugs were NOT worked out, it might be MORE suicidal for American crews to have to learn how to drive, operate, maintain, a new design, while in Combat! The decision WAS made to do all we could to IMPROVE the M4 design, constantly experimenting with engines, (mainly due to the shortage of aircraft radials) guns (105mm, and 76mm), armor, angles of the glacis, even later, suspensions (the HVSS was NOT new, it just took time to "fine tune," then it WAS retro fitted pretty quickly, even in the field, but NOT until it was"perfected...')

This decision making was NOT unique to TANKS....NO American Warplane, that saw service in WWII, until the VERY end, was designed DURING the war! EVERY design was designed PRIOR to our entry and "refined" until it was ultimately issued...the same generally with WARSHIPS....all were either DESIGNED or already laid down before the war...EXCEPT the Destroyer Escorts and smaller subchasers, which had BUGS and didn't get fully on line until 1943....DESPITE the pressing need we had for them in the Atlantic two years EARLIER....

That is the CORRECT decision in my book....if the M26 WAS sent into action quickly before the bugs were worked out, the crews probably would have died as easily as the first Panther crews at Kursk, when they were committed "before they were ready, and before the crews were trained...." (not MY quotes, but the German General Staff's....)

The M26 was deemed ready for LIMITED combat trials in late 1945, those 20 were the ONLY ones we had "ready," and it was JUST to prove to the world we had SOMETHING to match the Russian "Heavies..." But it was NEVER perfected..even the derived M46 was plagued by problems until it was replaced by the M47/48.

Quite POSSIBLY the only reason it did so WELL against the Panthers and Tiger IIs it encountered at that late stage of the war is because the German crews were so untrained and inexperienced...

I'll argue that Germany would have been BETTER off, LIGHTENING and SIMPLIFYING the Panther, and devoting just about ALL tank production to it,trying to get the bugs out of, and increasing production of, the Tiger I that they at least had some experience in, to use as a "stiffener" or heavy "assault tank" for the Panther divisions, and scrapping the idea of the Tiger II and anything HEAVIER....

If that doesn't convince you as to which were the better DESIGNS, then study the campaigns in which the M4/Shermans FOUGHT...

You cannot find ONE campaign where the Sherman FAILED (even Kasserine, it was the green US TANKERS who failed, not the TANKS...)

Yes you can find LOSSES, and yes, LARGE losses that are regrettable...but in the course of the war, we could AFFORD....

The final MYTH you have to get over, despite Coopers book title to the contrary, they were NOT "Deathtraps..."

The fact is only ONE tanker, on average, lost his life for each Sherman knocked out the ENTIRE war...were there catastrophic "brew ups" in which every crew member was killed before they could bail? ABSOLUTELY..but to AVERAGE one, then that means 4 ADDITIONAL M4s would have to be knocked out with NO tankers killed for each one like that!

SO even WITH so many knocked out, MOST were "mobility kills," where it hit a mine, and lost a track, with no casualties...or a hit in the engine, with everyone bailing out....

If you read any specific accounts of M4s in combat, bith isn US and British service, you see that MANY crews bailed out of MANY tanks, yet were back into the fight in ANOTHER tank, one PROBABLY repaired from being knocked out BEFORE, sometimes the same day! That is why you ALSO see tank names like "Nancy VI..." that was the SIXTH tank that Sergent or Lt. fought in, and he hadn't lost his life yet...

The fact that so MANY were repaired and back in service in such a short length of time is ANOTHER benefit of a well tested, reliable, easy to fix, design... another PLUS...

If you read this far, PS, thank you...

But I am NOT simply being obstinate....I have been this fired up about this topic since HIGH SCHOOL, and my FIRST teacher tried that "only won by sheer numbers" crap on me...I was ALREADY pretty well read on the subject, and have researched and argued it since.

About the only OTHER topics I am AS committed to changing people's opinions on is the importance of the New Guinea/Solomons Campaign to the Pacific war as opposed to the conventional wisdom that it was a "sideshow..." and the fact that the Civil War was actually decided in the WEST, and the most important and decisive battles actually took place over the control of Chattanooga... (as you have already heard in the past...!)

[millwright]

WTH does 50+ year old scrap iron have to do with the modern battlefront ? Personally, I can't see the U.S. spending the bucks to develop a new track-layer in the forseeable future. Right now most of our R&D bucks seem to be going into wheeled vehicles more suited to urban conflict - and even that's a debatable exercise.

The reality is no armoured vehicle can survive until and unless its air superiority/support is assured. To aircraft armour is just another LVT. I suspect the Russians, with their Hind series, hit upon the most effective way to put boots on the ground where needed and support them as well. >MW

[delta13soultaker]

Originally Posted by millwright

WTH does 50+ year old scrap iron have to do with the modern battlefront ?

50 years in military years is very little time. The U.S. Army's, as well as other branches, lineage spans over 2,000 years.

The past is often repeated.

"You can't know where you're going if you don't know where you've been."

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by delta13soultaker

The past is often repeated.

"You can't know where you're going if you don't know where you've been."

Amen!

And if I may add, the past is often repeated because it is either forgotten or ignored. Very little is actually new and origional.

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Amen!

And if I may add, the past is often repeated because it is either forgotten or ignored. Very little is actually new and origional.

Not to mention the fact that far too often military leaders tend to fight the new war using the tactics of the last one, USMC. That seldom works very well, as we found out in Vietnam.

[delta13soultaker]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Amen!

And if I may add, the past is often repeated because it is either forgotten or ignored. Very little is actually new and origional.

Yes. sir! Like the US Army's battle drill 1-A...squad attack or battle drill 2...react to contact (fix and flank)...it's been around since man figured out how to launch rocks.

The tools for killing change...but the methods and the outcome stay the same.

[delta13soultaker]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Not to mention the fact that far too often military leaders tend to fight the new war using the tactics of the last one, USMC. That seldom works very well, as we found out in Vietnam.

Yep. That's why we'll be hurting the next big high intensity war we fight (China). The insurgent battles have gontten us away from training for the huge manuever battles with chemical/nuclear threats. High intensity battles involve many perishable skills that are being forgotten.

I'm not mad yet though. Our learning curve is fast. And our military is still far far finer than the society it protects can even begin to deserve.

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Not to mention the fact that far too often military leaders tend to fight the new war using the tactics of the last one, USMC. That seldom works very well, as we found out in Vietnam.

And the Revolution, and the War Between the States, and WWI, and WWII, and Korea, and the Gulf War, and Iraq. At lease we usually learn, adapt and prevail, although slowly.

[Dakota Red 1]

Originally Posted by delta13soultaker

Yep. That's why we'll be hurting the next big high intensity war we fight (China). The insurgent battles have gontten us away from training for the huge manuever battles with chemical/nuclear threats. High intensity battles involve many perishable skills that are being forgotten.

I'm not mad yet though. Our learning curve is fast. And our military is still far far finer than the society it protects can even begin to deserve.

And I was going to burn all my AIR-LAND BATTLE pubs in the stove this winter. Maybe I ought to keep them for my son.
MBTs are just one round in the mag. Arty has been getting the short end lately. I only dropped into one FOB (Balad?) where I found cannon-cockers bragging about jerking a lanyard. Mostly they are on force protection and convoy security. They even got some 13Bs cleaned up enough to stand outside the Amb's office at the Embassy Annex.
Combined arms, dolloped out into self-contained blocks that can be assembled and disassembled at need from RCT to corps is something that's going away in our current shadow divisions. They should keep warfighting some of the old scenarios at Leavenworth, so we have command staff ready for continental war.
At the local level my old bunch is teaming up with tanks but in a 2X2 company configuration. Holy Hegel that freaks me! I'm used to doing everything in threes.
I love arty and tanks. They are masters of destruction. They humble me and my little rifle. I saw the inside of a reinforced concrete building (they weren't all mud brick) that some DAT crew had fired a sabot through. If nothing else, I would have died of fright if I had been in there. And even though I was not impressed with some recent close rocket and mortar hits from them other people, years ago our 155s had me spittless when our 113 broke down while crossing the impact area during a Combined Live Fire Exercise.
As a new private, I was told that a tanker wouldn't leave his machine to take a dump. Well I had been hearing a lot of stories (box of grid squares) but sure enough, within a week we came busting through the brush and there was an M60 crewman, facing the turret, heels hooked over the front of the glacis, squatted down with his arm around the gun tube and his coveralls undogged. And that is why we need to keep tanks and tankers. They are constant. They crap like birds on a perch and they run down range, coaxing and main gunning the crap out of stuff that a grunt (crunchie in DAT lingo) wouldn't want to have to deal with.

[17thfabn]

One thing I think would have made the Sherman better is if it had a "super wildcat from he11 round" for both the 75mm and 76 mm guns.

The idea of tanks not fighting tanks makes a lot of sense when you are on the offensive. It's the old "hit them where they ain't strategy". But some times you are going to meet other tanks, it's unavoidable. And on the defensive tanks will have to be used to stop breakthroughs of tank forces.

Towards the end of the war the Allies had h.v.a.p. rounds for their tank guns which could defeat all German armor. But these rounds were difficult to produce, and in short supply. What was needed was a "wildcat round". One that would only be used against tanks. A round that was just barley safe to use due to it's high velocity and or heavy weight of projectile.

The vast majority of rounds fired by our tanks were high explosives (h.e.). Our tanks spent a lot more time shooting at enemy troops, bunkers, strong points, trucks, halftracks, self propelled guns and armored cars than at true tanks. All these targets could be destroyed with h.e. rounds.

But the relativley few times we were shooting at enemy tanks our guys needed a round that would have a lot more "umpf". Such rounds might be hard on barrel life, but sinse used so little it wouldn't be much of an issue.

[FPDoc]

Originally Posted by polishshooter

No we did NOT win the war with sheer numbers, PS, that is one of the MYTHS of WWII....

The numbers HELPED, granted, but is it a FAULT to any tank to be easily built in high numbers and THEN shipped thousands of miles to ANY battlefield and still reliably do the job assigned? The Germans could have LEARNED from the M4....and would have been better off with a tank equivalent to it, rather than trying to make a heavier dinosaur....


No reliability and MOBILITY is the main weapon of any AFV, and ANY German tank after the PZ III and IV simply did NOT have it....

You have to face it, PS, panthers were a failure because of mechanical reliability, even though on paper they were perhaps the best design of the war, and both Tigers were underpowered and too heavy to be tactically effective even WITH enough fuel and transmissions that worked....

No, PS, the M4 was a VASTLY superior tank to any German tank when it came to doing what tanks were designed to do.....



In WWI, when the Allies had the reliable and relatively mobile and quick Renault and the Whippet and even the Mk IVs, the Germans only developed the A7, which was nothing but a slow unreliable underpowered PILLBOX....

At the end of WWII they were back to square one, in a war of rapid mobility, which the kicker is THEY pioneered, they developed only slow and unreliable PILLBOXES that they ended up with....

That's a Patton rationalization to justify losses in armor while advancing through Europe. Great from a desk or a jeep, but not encouraging to the tanker who is likely to get the second shot in after the Panzerfaust or the PAK40. Tanks have a role just as infantry as they are the only battlefield assets that can take and hold objectives. The gun/ missle and armor balance has been seesawing forever. After the 73 Yom Kippur War, every one thought armor was obsolete by the presence of cheap HEAT weapons like the sagger. So far, that hasn't panned out. Given current political climate, large armored clashes such as a Fulda Gap are less likely, hence a doctrine to shift to a lighter more rapidly deployable force. Abrams M1A2 was a Block 2 vehicle. Block 3 was a new concept that emphasized lighter weight and increased mobility. I haven't seen it yet. You get 2 armies with well trained crews in comparable generation vehicles, then you'll see some changes. IMHO.