WWI at Sea

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by TranterUK

Curiosity has now got the better of me and I have ordered the book 'Castles of Steel'.

It is well worth the read, Tranter. I'm a bit over half way through it right now, at the point where the British are about to attack the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles by bombardment from the sea, just prior to the Gallipoli Campaign. It is very well written, well documented, and--to my mind at least--a fascinating look at history. I suspect you will enjoy the book greatly.

[USMC-03]

Here are a couple of pictures out of a very interesting book titled The Nations of Europe: The Causes and Issues of the Great War by Charles Morris, copyright 1914. It gives a very interesting perspective of the time without the 20/20 vision of history.

[Pistolenschutze]

The Europeans had been building for that war ever since the 1880s, USMC. What is so ironic is that virtually no one realized what kind of war it would actually be when it came. The thinking was that it would last 6 months, a year at the most, and that modern weapons would make it impossible for nations to sustain the conflict. Little did they know that well over 20 million would die, and when all was said and done, the issues would still not be resolved.

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

The Europeans had been building for that war ever since the 1880s, USMC. What is so ironic is that virtually no one realized what kind of war it would actually be when it came. The thinking was that it would last 6 months, a year at the most, and that modern weapons would make it impossible for nations to sustain the conflict. Little did they know that well over 20 million would die, and when all was said and done, the issues would still not be resolved.

Exactly so, Pistol. While the arms race leading up to WWI started in the 1880's, the roots of the Great War can easily be traced back to the French Revolution, or even earlier.

The mentality of most war planners of the time was really still stuck in the Napoleonic era. A romantic view that the war would be decided with a few broadsides and bayonet charges was quickly shattered by technological advances that very few had the foresight to seriously consider. The lessons of the major wars of the late 18th Century (American War Between the States, the Franco-Prussian War, Spanish-American War and Boer War) were largely ignored by most military establishments and governments.

As usual it was the lowly rifleman and gunner's mate that paid the heaviest price.

[TranterUK]

What is this, the staff room of some American university? Your all so well read! Makes me feel igronant, igrenont, igrenant, thick.

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Exactly so, Pistol. While the arms race leading up to WWI started in the 1880's, the roots of the Great War can easily be traced back to the French Revolution, or even earlier.

Indeed, USMC, most specifically to the Congress of Vienna that followed the Napoleonic Wars and the reshaping of Europe that came from it. The Congress System was originally instituted with the idea of solving problems by meetings and with words instead of by armies and with bullets. In many ways it worked fairly well, at least up until the Crimean War in the 1850s, but in the end, the changes made by the great powers at Vienna resulted in a slow movement toward and intricate system of alliances among the major European powers, Britain, France, Germany (after 1871, Prussia before that), Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Those alliances ultimately proved their undoing when the series of Balkan crises arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Originally Posted by USMC-03

The mentality of most war planners of the time was really still stuck in the Napoleonic era. A romantic view that the war would be decided with a few broadsides and bayonet charges was quickly shattered by technological advances that very few had the foresight to seriously consider. The lessons of the major wars of the late 18th Century (American War Between the States, the Franco-Prussian War, Spanish-American War and Boer War) were largely ignored by most military establishments and governments.

As usual it was the lowly rifleman and gunner's mate that paid the heaviest price.

Every nation seemed to have the entrenched belief that any war would indeed be decided quickly. The entire German strategy was based on the idea of a "quick" and victorious war against France (6 weeks was the projection), then a fast turn on Russia before she could mobilize. It almost worked. Virtually no one realized the havoc modern woulds would wreak, however. Your point about lessons learned from the American Civil War especially is quite apt. That was the first truly "industrialized" war with killing in wholesale lots instead of penny packets. No one listened to the lessons that were there for the taking. Many European nations sent observers to both sides of the conflict, so there is little excuse for not having heeded the lesson.

[mrkirker]

Again and again, conflicts are initially fought with the successful tactics of the preceding conflict, while the technology of killing advances unabated.

As usual it was (and is) the lowly rifleman and gunner's mate that paid the heaviest price.

[Nighthawk]

Originally Posted by TranterUK

What is this, the staff room of some American university? Your all so well read! Makes me feel igronant, igrenont, igrenant, thick.

Amen - but I like reading their posts and yours also.
not to good on this stuff, but I do enjoy reading about military engagements.

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Indeed, USMC, most specifically to the Congress of Vienna that followed the Napoleonic Wars and the reshaping of Europe that came from it. The Congress System was originally instituted with the idea of solving problems by meetings and with words instead of by armies and with bullets. In many ways it worked fairly well, at least up until the Crimean War in the 1850s…

The Crimean may have been the first conflict to be photographed and saw the first use of many modern weapons; it really was, in my opinion, the last classic shoulder-to-shoulder/volley fire European style war. It was also the last of the romanticized wars; a la Tennyson's Charge of the Light Brigade.

I have done some limited reading into the Crimean War (though it seems all but forgotten today) and the one thing that always strikes me is how it happened almost as if by accident. All of the major participants acted and reacted in a very casual manner; simply positioning the chess pieces and expecting the other side to back down without serious bloodshed. When the fighting began it earnest, and with relatively heavy casualties, all sides were rather shocked.

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

…but in the end, the changes made by the great powers at Vienna resulted in a slow movement toward and intricate system of alliances among the major European powers, Britain, France, Germany (after 1871, Prussia before that), Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Those alliances ultimately proved their undoing when the series of Balkan crises arose in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

And this is the where the proverbial "European Powder Keg" was born.

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Every nation seemed to have the entrenched belief that any war would indeed be decided quickly. The entire German strategy was based on the idea of a "quick" and victorious war against France (6 weeks was the projection), then a fast turn on Russia before she could mobilize. It almost worked. Virtually no one realized the havoc modern woulds would wreak, however. Your point about lessons learned from the American Civil War especially is quite apt. That was the first truly "industrialized" war with killing in wholesale lots instead of penny packets. No one listened to the lessons that were there for the taking. Many European nations sent observers to both sides of the conflict, so there is little excuse for not having heeded the lesson.

The two main lessons of the War Between the States (it was not by definition a civil war) was that massed formations, especially when used against entrenched defenders, were no longer effective and the importance of mechanized logistics. As you say, there were large numbers of observers from the European powers, but also this was a conflict that was very well recorded and photographed. Even if no reports from observers were available, all sides had access to the vast amount of documentation and media accounts.

The two conflicts that should have been most closely studied by naval planners prior to 1914 were the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese War. These two wars provided the first examples of modern warships engaging in combat at the fleet level. I have to wonder if the Russian defeat at Tsushima was not heavy on the minds of Jellicoe, Beaty, Hipper and Scheer, thus making the battle of Jutland so indecisive. Had any one of them been more aggressive the North Sea could have seen a considerable amount of steel and many sailors at her bottom.

Originally Posted by mrkirker

Again and again, conflicts are initially fought with the successful tactics of the preceding conflict, while the technology of killing advances unabated.(

And forever after refought by the armchair generals and admirals.

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

The two main lessons of the War Between the States (it was not by definition a civil war) was that massed formations, especially when used against entrenched defenders, were no longer effective and the importance of mechanized logistics. As you say, there were large numbers of observers from the European powers, but also this was a conflict that was very well recorded and photographed. Even if no reports from observers were available, all sides had access to the vast amount of documentation and media accounts.

Very, very true, USMC. Lee learned that very hard lesson on the 3rd day at Gettysburg with the virtual destruction of Pickett's Brigade; Burnside learned it on Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, or should have, and Grant learned it even more bloodily at Cold Harbor. Massed troops frontally assaulting entrenched positions was simply no longer a viable military option. In the face of massed artillery, and still later, machine guns, such actions were literally suicidal. Yet for over three years both sides flung millions of young men repeatedly at such positions, and the butcher's bill doesn't even bear contemplating.

Originally Posted by USMC-03

The two conflicts that should have been most closely studied by naval planners prior to 1914 were the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese War. These two wars provided the first examples of modern warships engaging in combat at the fleet level. I have to wonder if the Russian defeat at Tsushima was not heavy on the minds of Jellicoe, Beaty, Hipper and Scheer, thus making the battle of Jutland so indecisive. Had any one of them been more aggressive the North Sea could have seen a considerable amount of steel and many sailors at her bottom.

Both sides knew of, and had carefully studied, the battle at Tsushima Straits in 1905, and I think it was certainly on their minds. The Russian experience was not a pleasant one, to say the least, though one might argue that it was not so much Japanese brilliance that won, but rather the disreputable state of the Russian ships. Yet what really prevented a decision at Jutland, I believe, were the political considerations and restraints placed on both commanders before that engagement. "Whatever you do, don't loose the fleet!" Neither commander was willing to gamble with the possibility of literally loosing the war in an afternoon. Without the Grand Fleet, Britain stood helpless against invasion and bombardment, and conversely, without the High Seas Fleet, Germany would have been subject to total blockade.

Originally Posted by USMC-03

And forever after refought by the armchair generals and admirals.

True, especially the War of Northern Aggression.

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Yet what really prevented a decision at Jutland, I believe, were the political considerations and restraints placed on both commanders before that engagement. "Whatever you do, don't loose the fleet!" Neither commander was willing to gamble with the possibility of literally loosing the war in an afternoon. Without the Grand Fleet, Britain stood helpless against invasion and bombardment, and conversely, without the High Seas Fleet, Germany would have been subject to total blockade.

That is exactly correct. Had any of the commanders lost an entire fleet they would have been retired in disgrace at the very least. As it is, they may be soundly criticized and second guessed by Monday morning admirals until times end, but that's far better than being known as the one person who lost the war.

Here is another interesting picture from that same book showing the military strength of the major antagonists on in Western Europe. By looking at just the numbers it's easy to see there the German confidence in a quick land campaign came from. And also just why "Britannia Rules the Waves" was not just a song.

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

True, especially the War of Northern Aggression.

Oh, you mean the War of Southern Secession...

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

That is exactly correct. Had any of the commanders lost an entire fleet they would have been retired in disgrace at the very least. As it is, they may be soundly criticized and second guessed by Monday morning admirals until times end, but that's far better than being known as the one person who lost the war.

Jellicoe made it clear from the time he took command of the Grand Fleet in 1914 that discretion would be the watchword under his flag. Kaiser Wilhelm also made it clear from the outset that his fleet commanders were not to risk his ships unless compelled by the most dire of circumstances. He was willing, at least in the first year of the war, to risk his battlecruisers on occasional raids, but after they were almost caught and destroyed after the Scarborough and Yorkshire raid, he forbade even that.

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Here is another interesting picture from that same book showing the military strength of the major antagonists on in Western Europe. By looking at just the numbers it's easy to see there the German confidence in a quick land campaign came from. And also just why "Britannia Rules the Waves" was not just a song.

Numbers alone, however, were deceptive. The British held the edge on paper, that is true, but the Admiralty knew (though it was kept from the public) that Germany's ships were actually more capable than their British counterparts. Germany's best chance for a decisive victory, I think, was in 1914 or perhaps early 1915 before the British ship-building program greatly augmented the Grand Fleet with the new Dreadnought class battleships and battlecruisers that were already on the building ways. Wilhelm was much too timid to risk that.

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Oh, you mean the War of Southern Secession...

Officially, the Civil War is known as "The War of the Rebellion." Down South, it is officially referred to as "The War of Northern Aggression." The latter name is, of course, far more accurate.

[USMC-03]

Originally Posted by Pistolenschutze

Numbers alone, however, were deceptive. The British held the edge on paper, that is true, but the Admiralty knew (though it was kept from the public) that Germany's ships were actually more capable than their British counterparts.

Not only that, but Brittan also had to protect the sea lanes to the rest of her global empire and to the United States, thus limiting the number of vessels blockading the High Seas Fleet to an almost equal standing, at least until 1916 to 1917.

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

Not only that, but Brittan also had to protect the sea lanes to the rest of her global empire and to the United States, thus limiting the number of vessels blockading the High Seas Fleet to an almost equal standing, at least until 1916 to 1917.

Very true, USMC. For example, it was only begrudgingly that the Admiralty was willing temporarily to release battlecruisers from the Grand Fleet to go after von Spee's commerce-raiding cruisers, even though it was evident after the disaster at Coronel that they were the only viable answer to the threat. Another example lies with the commitment of warships from the fleet to the Dardanelles effort.

[Pistolenschutze]

Well, I finished reading the Massie book, Castles of Steel. I must say, I consider it an excellent history indeed. Massie not only described the naval engagements of World War I, but he gave excellent insight into the lives of the combatants and the politicians behind them, particularly Churchill. After reading this, I am no longer so certain Jellicoe acted too timidly at Jutland. If anyone was to blame for the less-than-spectacular success of the British fleet in that battle, I think that blame must fall mostly on Beatty, though he is the one who received all the kudos from the public. Communication--or lack thereof--was the key factor in the engagement, and Jellicoe was not given the information from either the Admiralty or Beatty's battle cruiser squadron that he needed to trap the German fleet. On such little things the events of history so often turn.

[USMC-03]

I've got Castles of Steel on my reading list on your recomendation Pistol. I'll be looking forward to reading the passages on Churchill; he's one of my favorite historical figures.

So many books, so little time...

[Pistolenschutze]

Originally Posted by USMC-03

I've got Castles of Steel on my reading list on your recomendation Pistol. I'll be looking forward to reading the passages on Churchill; he's one of my favorite historical figures.

So many books, so little time...

I think you will enjoy it, USMC, especially considering your interest in the First World War. Massie goes into several chapters of detail on the Jutland engagement, which I found particularly interesting. Generally, I found his analysis quite apt since he is not biased in his assessment of either side.